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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines stock market reaction to cross-border acquisition 
announcements that involve Eastern European emerging-market targets. Using a 
unique and a manually collected dataset, we identify 125 cross-border acquisitions in 
which developed-market firms from France, Germany, Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom acquire ownership stakes in emerging as well as developed-markets in 
Europe during the period January 2000 through December 2011. In line with previous 
findings on foreign cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&As) in emerging-
markets, evidence suggests that when the target firm is located in either the Czech-
Republic, Hungary, Poland, or Russia, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to the 
acquiring developed-market firm shows a statistically significant increase of 1.26% 
over a three day event window, following the announcement. Thereby, the relative 
size of the acquirer to the target appears to be the only significant factor that 
contributes to positive acquirer returns. The result is robust to the inclusion of 
controls for country, industry, as well as acquirer, target, and firm specific 
characteristics. Moreover, cross-border M&As involving an emerging-market target 
result in higher value creation for the acquiring shareholders than cross-border 
transactions into developed-markets.  
JEL Code: G34 
Key words: cross border, merger and acquisition, Eastern Europe, cumulative 
abnormal returns 
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1 Introduction 
Evidence suggests that firms engage in merger and acquisition (M&A) activity if it 
results in wealth gains for the shareholders of the acquiring company (Aybar and 
Ficici (2009); Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993); Chari et al. (2010); Moeller et al 
(2004); Goddard et al. (2012), Manne (1965)). Whether the announcement of such 
an event will be beneficial for shareholders in the short-term is an essential question 
for top management. Both managers and investors are keenly interested in knowing 
as much as possible about the potential impact of M&A announcements. As the 
probability of such an announcement increases, they might decide to either invest or 
divest their share in company grounded on the findings of an empirical study (Dalkir 
& Warren-Boulton, 2001). The literature on the stock price reaction triggered by the 
announcement of M&A within the boundaries of developed-markets is extensive, 
whereas it is relatively scarce on cross-border transactions involving an emerging-
market target (Mentz & Schiereck, 2008). Mainly, this situation has arisen because 
emerging-market countries maintained high barriers and restrictions on foreign 
participation until the 1990s. However, global and cross-border M&A activity has 
increased hugely over the last 20 years. The number of cross-border transactions 
involving a European emerging-market target surged from 18 to a record high of 755 
from 1990 to 2010 respectively (Thomson One). The increase in deal value for the 
period from 1990 to 2011 for developed-markets and emerging-markets corresponds 
to an average growth rate of 5.7% and 15.8%, respectively (Thomson One). Deal 
value increased from close to zero in 1990 to $29.3 billion in 2011. The U.S. has 
dominated the market in the early 1990s, but Europe continues to claim a bigger 
market share, with the share of emerging-market involvement continuing to rise.  
This paper makes a contribution to the literature by analysing stock market reaction 
to cross border acquisition announcements involving Eastern European emerging 
market targets, which is a relatively under-researched area in the literature. We 
examine the determinants of positive acquirer returns, controlling for country, industry 
as well as acquirer, target and firm specific characteristics. We find that, for foreign 
acquisitions in Eastern Europe, the relative size of the acquirer is the only significant 
factor that explains positive acquirer returns.   
On the basis of recent transaction data, this paper aims at providing evidence for the 
existence of a positive value effect for acquiring shareholders in cross-border 
transactions into emerging-markets. In contrast to the majority of previous empirical 
studies, our research considers only cross-border transactions within the boundaries 
of Europe and further limits the potential location of targets to emerging-market 
countries in Eastern Europe. Thereby, the stock market reaction is used to provide an 
answer to the following two questions: 
1. Do cross-border transactions into Eastern European emerging-markets lead to 
a positive shareholder wealth effect to the acquiring firms from developed-
markets during the three days around the announcement date? 
 
2. Do cross-border transactions into Eastern European emerging-markets create 
higher positive abnormal returns for the acquirers than cross-border 
transactions into developed-market countries? 
Changes in the stock price of the acquirer reveal information about the potential 
wealth gain/loss from the M&A. Depending on the anticipated magnitude of wealth 
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creation from the transaction, shareholder returns will go up or down around the 
announcement date. Event study methodology is used to measure the impact of 
acquisition announcements on the wealth of the acquiring firms’ shareholders. Our 
paper addresses a research gap linked to relative neglect of wealth effects for target 
shareholders within the literature. To provide an answer to these central questions 
and to identify whether the creation/destruction of shareholder value can be put into 
the context of emerging markets, we further analyse 56 cross-border M&A of the 
same developed-market acquirers with the difference that the acquisition target is 
located in a developed-market in Europe. The empirical analysis concentrates on the 
short-term cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to acquirers from developed-markets 
and does not look at the ex-post and long-term performance of the firms. In a final 
step, a suitable multivariate regression analysis is carried out to test determinants of 
cross-sectional variations.  
The primary contribution of this paper is to use novel data and suitable methods to 
assess the link between foreign acquisitions and effect on shareholder wealth. We 
investigate how capital markets react to cross-border acquisition announcements 
involving an emerging-market target in Eastern Europe based on sample data from 
January 2000 to December 2011. We examine the shareholder wealth effect to the 
acquiring firms from four developed-markets (France, Germany, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom) and provides an answer to the question of whether cross-border 
transactions into Eastern European emerging-markets (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Russia) create higher positive abnormal returns for acquirers than cross-
border transaction into developed-market countries.  
Following the EU expansion in 2004, our paper provides an insight into the 
functioning of the single market, especially with respect to three important East 
European countries that we study (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic). Prior 
empirical research has focused either on the shareholder wealth effect of 
transactions into distinct emerging countries or emerging-markets with relatively 
small sample sizes. To our knowledge, there is no such research based on a sample 
that is limited to emerging-market targets in the European region. In particular, the 
result is expected to provide insights into anticipated future impact of cross-border 
M&A in European emerging-markets on the stock price of the acquiring company. We 
first provide an explanation of the motivation behind M&A and a critical analysis of 
the existing literature on shareholder wealth creation. The subsequent section 
summarises the data and elaborates the research methodology. We next present 
and discuss the results of this empirical study. The final section concludes. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Motives for Mergers and Acquisition 
The growing integration of the global market for goods, capital, labour, and services 
has been driving cross-border M&A. Motives for a transaction depend on the 
individual company, the respective industry, the current economic environment, and 
various other influencing factors (DePamphilis, 2012). Empirical evidence strongly 
suggests that M&A activity leads to significant wealth creation for the combined entity 
of acquirers and targets. Returns are often not distributed equally between the 
acquirer and the target. While target firm shareholders seem to benefit in the majority 
of the cases, regardless of involvement in domestic or cross-border transactions, the 
4 
 
share price reaction of the acquirer firm is often destructive. However, this is not the 
case in cross-border transactions into emerging-markets. At least in the short-term, 
acquirers in cross-border transactions involving an emerging-market target tend to 
outperform acquirers in pure domestic transactions (Chari , Quimet, & Tesar, 2004b).  
Synergies 
The combination of two firms creates greater value for the shareholders than two 
entities that are operated separately. Synergies create value as result of increased 
profitability in either one or both of the businesses due to a transfer of know-how and 
technology, for example. Chari et al. (2004b) highlight that cost reduction in the 
combined firm can also lead to synergies and an increase in value of the combined 
firm. Goergen and Renneboog (2004), Gupta et al. (1997) and Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) find strong evidence that synergy is the prime motive for M&A.  
 
Access to Capital 
Cross-border acquisitions can also create value by lowering the cost of capital 
through an improved access to capital markets. Firms might be confronted with high 
capital costs, especially in emerging markets that in turn limit the scope of profitable 
projects that can be undertaken. Other motives for international expansion include 
accelerated growth, lower labour costs, avoidance of entry barriers, minimising tax 
liabilities, and leverage intangible assets (DePamphilis, 2012).  
Globalisation 
The international integration in areas such as transport, information technology, and 
communication results in an increasing interconnection of people and countries. In 
the pursuit of meeting growth expectations, developed-market firms in particular are 
constantly looking for access to lower production costs and growth opportunities in 
other countries, that often exist in emerging-markets (Mentz & Schiereck, 2008). 
Deregulation 
There are still countries with high regulations and barriers that make cross-border 
transactions very difficult and sometimes even impossible. However, the trend has 
been towards the elimination of barriers and increased volumes of M&As. Within the 
European Union more cross-border transactions have been observed in recent years 
in industries that have been strongly regulated in previous years, e.g. energy, 
banking (Bruner, 2002) and broadcasting in the UK Gardiner (2006).  
Geographic diversification 
For emerging-market firms, it has become increasingly important to reduce sovereign 
exposure and the likelihood of political expropriation by purchasing assets in 
developed-markets. Hereby, diversification is an integral part of the companies’ 
growth strategies (Chari , Quimet, & Tesar, 2004b). Anticipated benefits are often not 
achieved because of overpayment due to an overestimation of potential benefits 
and/or managerial hubris. Hubris and agency problems are frequent motives for 
acquisitions (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993). Management can place self-interest 
before shareholder wealth maximisation (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004). Yet another 
reason for failure, is the issue of cultural compatibility, and different corporate and 
national culture (Schoenberg, 2005). Capital markets, occasionally, perceive cost of 
cultural integration to be larger than the potential synergies from the acquisition 
(Camerer and Weber, 2003). 
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Bargaining Power in Emerging Markets 
In a domestic acquisition in developed-markets, the acquirer may have less 
bargaining power relative to the target than in an acquisition of a firm located in an 
emerging-market. The improved position in foreign acquisitions might be a direct 
result of government policies that facilitate foreign acquisitions or simply less 
domestic interest in the target, resulting in reduced price competition and therefore a 
lower price. Ultimately, this could lead to a positive abnormal return for the acquiring 
firm (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002) and (Chari , Quimet, & Tesar, 2004a).  
Information Asymmetry 
Developed-market acquirers can be in a better position to determine the fundamental 
value of the emerging-market target than the company itself. If the target lacks the 
capabilities to come up with an accurate company valuation on a stand-alone basis, it 
will be in a poor position to negotiate the best possible price for the company. The 
stock price of listed companies is of less value and significance to developed-market 
acquirers because of the, generally, less stable economic environment (Chari , 
Quimet, & Tesar, 2004b). Therefore, enhanced valuation capabilities of developed-
market acquirers allow for informational synergies (Goergen and Renneboog, 2003).  
Cross-border M&A into emerging-markets usually show a more positive impact on 
acquiring shareholders value than comparable domestic transactions. Also, cross-
border transactions tend to show a negative impact on shareholder value at the 
announcement date. Denis et al. (2002) analyse cultural and national differences that 
have to be overcome in cross-border transactions that should incur higher costs for 
post-merger integration than a comparable transaction within the boundaries of a 
country. Ceteris paribus, acquirer returns should be higher in domestic transactions. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) provide some evidence of significantly negative 
abnormal returns, at the 10% level, for bidding companies that are already 
diversified, based on a sample size of 136 transactions. In contrast to Mago et al. 
(2008) and Danbolt (2004), they suggest that acquiring companies in the same 
sector/industry do not have any significant short-term wealth effects on neither the 
bidder nor the target company. Further arguments against a positive wealth effect in 
cross-border transactions are provided by Conn et al. (2003). According to them, 
factors such as: i) imperfect information and ii) management integration point to lower 
returns for cross-border M&A.   
2.2 Value Creation through Cross-Border M&A 
Though it is difficult to identify and quantify the driving forces behind particular M&As, 
the concept of measuring the extent of value creation is relatively straightforward. 
Under the assumptions that the developed-market acquirer gains majority control of 
the emerging-market target and certainty about the successful completion of the 
transaction on the announcement date, the following simplified calculation can be 
made: the combined company values minus the pre-announcement stand-alone 
values of the firms, both at the announcement date. In an efficient capital market, 
stock prices adjust immediately to the merger announcement, incorporating all 
anticipated value gains and losses (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001). From a 
statistical point of view, short-term event studies, usually with a three-day event 
window, are the most reliable approach to determine whether the acquisition creates 
or destroys shareholder value. Ex-post performance measures are more sensitive to 
different sample periods and the choice of the market portfolio that is used to 
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measure risk (Barber, Richard, & Chih-Ling, 1999). Goddard et al. (2012) study 
M&As in banking in Asia and Latin between 1998-2009 where they conclude that on 
average M&As result in shareholder value for target firms, but acquirer firms do not 
lose shareholder value. 
Table 2.1: Summary of Recent Empirical Studies on M&A 
 
 
The literature on the stock price reaction triggered by the announcement of M&A 
within the boundaries of developed markets is extensive (see Table 2.1). However, it 
is relatively sparse on cross-border transactions, especially with emerging-market 
involvement (Mentz & Schiereck, 2008).  
2.2.1 Developed-Market Acquirers Targeting Developed-Market Firms  
Domestic 
Empirical evidence suggests that M&A create shareholder value, but returns are not 
distributed equally among acquirer and target shareholders. Andrade et al. (2001) 
emphasize that most of the combined gains from domestic transactions accrue to 
target shareholders, leaving the acquirer with zero or even negative returns. His 
sample of 1,864 domestic transactions in the United States displayed an 
announcement return of -1.00% to the bidder firm (see Table 2.2). Similar results 
have been observed earlier by Brickley et al. (1988) and by Draper and Paudyal 
(1999) in the UK. The study with the most recent data sample (2000–2010), carried 
out by Ings and Inoue (2012), on the other hand, indicates positive short-term wealth 
effects of 0.22% for Japanese acquirers in domestic transactions. Lowinski et al. 
(2004) have shown earlier that acquiring shareholders benefit from domestic 
transaction announcements in Switzerland as well. Campa and Hernando (2004) and 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) focus on domestic transactions in several 
developed-markets in Europe. Whereas Campa and Hernando (2004) found 
evidence for positive CAR for bidders, Goergen and Renneboog’s (2004) sample 
data resulted in a negative CAR. Kirchhoff et al. (2006) sum it up by stating that 
shareholders of target firms are clearly benefited from domestic M&A activities 
Authors
Acquirer Nation - Developed 
Markets (DM) or Emerging 
Markets (EM)
Target Nation - Developed 
Markets (DM) or Emerging 
Markets (EM)
Domestic (D) or 
Cross-Border 
(CB) Analysis
Sample 
Period
Sample 
Size
1 Ings and Inoue (2012) Japan DM and EM D, CB 2000 - 2010 381
2 Chari et al. (2010) DM (9) EM (43) and DM (9) CB 1986 - 2006 2218
3 Burns and Liebenberg (2009) United States EM (20) and DM (26) CB 1988 - 2004 779
4 Bris and Cabolis (2008) DM and EM DM and EM CB 1989 - 2002 506
5 Nagano and Yuan (2007) DM and EM China and India CB 1996 - 2006 627
6 Chari et al. (2004) DM EM East Asia (5) CB 1988 - 2002 346
EM Latin America (4)
7 Campa and Hernando (2004) DM Europe (15) DM Europe (15) D, CB 1998 - 2000 262
8 Goergen and Renneboog (2004) DM Europe (18) DM Europe (18) D, CB 1993 - 2000 187
9 Lowinski et al. (2004) Swiss DM Worldwide D, CB 1990 - 2001 114
10 Andrade et al. (2001) United States United States D 1990 - 1998 1864
The number in brackets indicates the amount of acquiring/ target nations in the empirical study.
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whereas there is no clear evidence supporting the argument that domestic M&A 
results in wealth creation for the acquiring company’s shareholders.  
Cross-Border 
Kang (1993), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) do not 
find evidence for significant positive short-term returns for acquirers based on data 
samples from the 1980s and 1990s. Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) are two of the 
few who have documented even a negative cross-border effect for acquirer stock 
returns from the perspective of U.S. acquirers; based on a dataset of 4,430 
acquisitions between 1985 and 1995. Nevertheless, some empirical studies find 
evidence for significant positive announcement returns, most recently, Burns and 
Liebenberg (2009). A sample of 667 transactions from U.S. firms into 26 different 
developed countries showed a significant cumulative abnormal return of 0.93% for 
the three days around the announcement date. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find 
a significant CAR of 3.09% for cross-border transactions within Europe.  
Table 2.2: CAR to Acquirers within the Boundaries of Developed-Markets 
 
 
 
As Table 2.2 indicates, CAR are not consistently positive or negative neither for 
domestic nor cross border M&A. Earlier results, e.g. from Eun et al. (1996) who 
analysed Japanese and UK firms acquiring companies in the United States, 
document similar findings. Whereas cross-border transactions originating in Japan 
showed a significant positive announcement return for acquirers, acquirers from the 
UK displayed a significantly negative return. Positive announcement returns are the 
product of certain combinations of acquirer and target countries. Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) find similar results when examining the short-term wealth effects 
of cross-border transactions within the boundaries of Europe between 1993 and 
2000. They find higher abnormal returns for acquiring companies headquartered in 
the UK (1.5%) versus those headquartered in Continental Europe (0.9%) over a five 
day event window centred on the announcement date. Bidders in domestic 
Authors
Acquirer Nation - Developed 
Markets (DM)
Target Nation - Developed 
Markets (DM)
Domestic or 
Cross-Border
Sample 
Period
Sample 
Size
Event 
Window
Bidder 
Return
1 Ings and Inoue (2012) Japan Japan D 2000 - 2010 232 (-1, +1) 0.22%
2 Chari et al. (2010) DM (9) DM (9) CB 1986 - 2006 1624 (-1, +1) -0.28%
3 Burns and Liebenberg (2009) United States DM (26) CB 1988 - 2004 667 (-1, +1) 0.93% ***
(-2, +2) 1.23% ***
4 Bris and Cabolis (2008) DM and EM DM and EM CB 1989 - 2002 506 (-2, +2) -1.12% **
7 Campa and Hernando (2004) DM Europe (15) DM Europe (15) D 1998 - 2000 182 (-1, +1) 0.61%
CB 1998 - 2000 80 (-1, +1) 0.05% -
8 Goergen and Renneboog (2004) DM Europe (18) DM Europe (18) D 1993 - 2000 86 (-1, 0) -0.45%
(-2, +2) -0.10%
DM Europe (18) CB 1993 - 2000 56 (-1, 0) 2.38% ***
(-2, +2) 3.09% ***
9 Lowinski et al. (2004) Swiss Swiss D 1990 - 2001 23 (-1, +1) 0.32%
(-2, +2) 0.21%
CB 1990 - 2001 91 (-1, +1) 1.26% ***
(-2, +2) 1.36% ***
10 Andrade et al. (2001) United States United States D 1990 - 1998 1864 (-1, +1) -1.00%
The number in brackets indicates the amount of acquiring/ target nations in the empirical study.
***, **,and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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transactions earn marginally negative abnormal returns of -0.7%. From their findings 
they conclude that institutional differences across the countries might be the cause 
for the observed results. Citing La Porta et al. (1998) they refer to the higher degree 
of protection of shareholder rights and higher takeover regulation transparency in the 
UK versus those in Continental Europe. While Mentz and Schiereck (2008) show that 
cross-border transactions in the automotive supply industry create value for the 
acquiring shareholders, Dewenter (1995) did not find evidence that positive 
announcement returns are connected to industry-specific circumstances.  
Empirical evidence on the acquirer’s share price reactions from domestic and cross-
border transactions are mixed within the sphere of developed-markets. While 
consensus is reached on the fact that target shareholders profit from M&As, there is 
disagreement about acquirer returns (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001). However, 
the majority of the literature suggests that the acquirer is left with zero or even 
negative returns (Brickley et al. 1988, Draper and Paudyal 1999, Andrade et al. 
2001). Any positive acquirer short-term wealth gains are the product of certain 
combinations of acquirer and target countries (Eun, Kolodny, & Scheraga, 1996). 
2.2.2 Developed-Market Acquirers Targeting Emerging-Market Firms 
Cross-Border 
When an emerging-market target is involved in the transaction, the evidence on 
acquirer returns is less mixed as compared to pure developed-market transactions. 
Chari et al. (2004a) concentrate on a sample of emerging-market targets in nine 
countries across Latin American and East Asia over the period 1988-2002 (see Table 
2.3). They found that shareholder returns for acquirer as well as target firms showed 
a statistically significant increase of 2.4% and 6.9%, respectively, at announcement. 
The stock market anticipates value creation from cross-border M&A that involve 
emerging-market targets. A sub-sample of 92 transactions comprising only 
acquisitions that led to a transfer of majority control to the acquirer showed an even 
higher statistically significant increase of the CAR by 3.99%. They found value 
creation to be closely linked to the acquisition of corporate control. In a more 
extensive study, Chari et al. (2010) analysed 594 cross-border transactions of 
developed-market acquirers from ten different developed-market countries and target 
firms from 43 different emerging-markets between 1986 and 2006. Similar to their 
previous findings, the empirical evidence showed that acquiring majority control in 
emerging-markets leads to a statistically significant increase in the acquiring firm’s 
stock price of 1.16%, on average, over a three-day event window. Even though 
significantly lower than for developed-market acquirers, emerging-market acquirers 
also realised positive returns in transactions involving emerging-market targets. In a 
study with focus on the Czech Republic, Kocenda and Svejnar (2003) find that 
foreign ownership improves firm performance in that country. 
Nagano and Yuan (2007) examined the consequences of foreign cross-border 
acquisitions in the two largest emerging-markets, China and India, using transaction 
data from 1998-2006. Their empirical findings are in line with previous studies. 
Acquiring control in emerging markets results in a significant abnormal return for the 
foreign acquirer. Ings and Inoue (2012) differentiate their data sample to analyse 
acquirer returns in different periods of economic growth. In the years of slow 
economic growth in G7 countries (from 2008 to 2010), they find that acquisitions 
involving targets in emerging-markets create a higher abnormal return to the acquirer 
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than comparable cross-border transactions with targets in developed-markets. The 
CAR for the period from 2000 – 2010 was 1.38% and significant at the 5% level. 
Table 2.3: Average CAR to Acquirers Targeting Emerging-Markets 
 
 
 
The shareholder wealth effect to the acquiring firms from emerging-markets is not 
part of this research. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that domestic as well as 
cross-border transactions between emerging-markets have resulted in a positive 
return throughout all studies under review in this paper. Chari et al. (2010) report a 
positive and statistically significant median CAR (-1, +1) of 0.13% for a sample of 900 
transactions in 17 emerging-markets announced between 1986 and 2006. Nagano 
and Yuan (2007) focus on China and India and examine a sample with transaction 
data from 1998 to 2006. For domestic transactions, they report a positive and 
statistically significant average CAR (-1, +1) of 0.51% and 0.99% in China and India, 
respectively. 
2.3 Our hypotheses  
For cross-border transactions into emerging-markets in Europe, we hypothesise a 
positive shareholder wealth effect to the acquiring firms from developed-markets for 
the three days around the announcement date, mainly through synergies and other 
benefits outlined previously. Moreover, because of a higher bargaining power in 
emerging-markets and information asymmetry in emerging markets, it is expected 
that cross-border transactions into emerging-markets create a higher positive 
abnormal return for acquirers than cross-border transactions into developed-markets.  
Hypothesis 1: Cross-border transactions into Eastern European emerging-markets 
lead to a positive shareholder wealth effect to the acquiring firms from 
developed-markets during the three days around the announcement 
date. 
Hypothesis 2: Cross-border transactions into Eastern European emerging-markets 
create higher positive abnormal returns for the acquirers than cross-
border transactions into developed-markets. 
The stock market recognises the positive/negative effect of acquisition 
announcements. However, it remains difficult for economic researchers to identify the 
underlying sources of value gains reliably (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001). 
Authors
Acquirer Nation - Developed 
Markets (DM)
Target Nation - Emerging 
Markets (EM)
Domestic or 
Cross-Border
Sample 
Period
Sample 
Size
Event 
Window
Bidder 
Return
1 Ings and Inoue (2012) Japan EM CB 2000 - 2010 149 (-1, +1) 1.38% **
2 Chari et al. (2010) DM (9) EM (43) CB 1986 - 2006 594 (-1, +1) 1.16% **
3 Burns and Liebenberg (2009) United States EM (20) CB 1988 - 2004 112 (-1, +1) 2.16% **
(-2, +2) 2.73% **
5 Nagano and Yuan (2007) DM and EM China CB 1996 - 2006 484 (-1, +1) 2.47% ***
India CB 1996 - 2006 143 (-1, +1) 1.96% **
6 Chari et al. (2004) DM EM East Asia (5) CB 1988 - 2002 230 (-1, +1) 2.70% **
EM Latin America (4) CB 1988 - 2002 116 (-1, +1) 1.89% **
EA and LA (9)1 CB 1988 - 2002 92 (-1, +1) 3.99% ***
The number in brackets indicates the amount of acquiring/ target nations in the empirical study.
***, **,and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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Although it is difficult to provide precise tests for each factor that might show an effect 
on acquirer returns, a number of sensible variables are tested that proxy for those 
effects. Based on whether the announcement returns systematically co-vary with 
those proxies, it is possible to draw conclusions to the corresponding factors.  
The literature review has revealed a large number of possible determinants that have 
been subject to extensive testing in previous studies. Only a few of them, including, 
but not limited to Relative Size of the acquirer, have shown repeatedly to cause a 
significant impact on acquirer returns (see Table 2.4).  
Table 2.4: CAR Targeting Emerging-Markets and Explaining Variables 
 
The focus in this paper is placed on transactions within the boundaries of Europe and 
in particular transactions into European emerging-markets. Prior empirical research 
has focused either on the shareholder wealth effect of transactions into distinct 
emerging countries or emerging-markets with sample data on 20 and more countries. 
To our knowledge, there is no such research based on a sample that is limited to 
emerging-market targets in the European region. In particular, the result is expected 
to provide insights into anticipated future impact of cross-border M&A in European 
emerging-markets on the stock price of the acquiring company.  
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
Since previous research on cross-border M&A activity is largely confined to the U.S. 
and the UK, it is the objective of this empirical study to find out whether cross-border 
M&A into emerging-markets create value for developed-market acquirers. In 
particular, we consider a sample of developed-market acquirers from France, 
Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom and emerging-market targets from 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia for the period from January 2000 
to December 2011. 
World cross-border M&A activity peaked in the year 2000. Starting from that year, the 
sample incorporates transaction announcements from periods of a slowing economy 
and declining M&A activity up to the year 2003. Further, it embraces transactions that 
have been announced in a booming economy, rising stock markets, low interest 
rates, and high liquidity in the markets from 2004 to 2007. In addition, it includes data 
for the most recent years from 2008 onwards which have been under used in prior 
Authors
Acquirer Nation - 
Developed Markets (DM)
Target Nation - Emerging 
Markets (EM)
Sample 
Period
Event 
Window
Bidder 
Return Explaining Variables
1 Ings and Inoue (2012) Japan EM 2000 - 2010 (-1, +1) 1.38% ** Relative Size***
2 Chari et al. (2010) DM (9) EM (43) 1986 - 2006 (-1, +1) 1.16% ** Majority Control***
3 Burns and Liebenberg (2009) United States EM (20) 1988 - 2004 (-1, +1) 2.16% ** -
(-2, +2) 2.73% ** -
5 Nagano and Yuan (2007) DM and EM China 1996 - 2006 (-1, +1) 2.47% *** Relative Size***, Majority Control***
India 1996 - 2006 (-1, +1) 1.96% ** Majority Control***
6 Chari et al. (2004) DM EM East Asia (5) 1988 - 2002 (-1, +1) 2.70% ** Majority Control***
EM Latin America (4) 1988 - 2002 (-1, +1) 1.89% **
EA and LA (9)1 1988 - 2002 (-1, +1) 3.99% ***
The number in brackets indicates the amount of acquiring/ target nations in the empirical study.
***, **,and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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empirical research. As a result, the sample is not biased towards a particular 
macroeconomic environment.  
The sample transactions and relevant transaction data is retrieved from 
ThomsonONE.com Investment Banking (Thomson) that is a reliable and well-
regarded source used widely internationally. Thomson Reuters Deal Analytics 
screens and filters financial data for over 55,000 active public companies globally. In 
total, we identified a workable sample of 125 M&A announcements between January 
2000 and December 2011. For each transaction, Thomson provided the date on 
which the transaction was announced, company name, the status of the company 
(private/ public), acquirer/target nation, primary industry code (SIC), percent of 
shares sought/ owned after transaction, and the value of the transaction. The stock 
price return data was taken from Thomson Datastream or the respective stock 
exchange. 
We consider two data samples. The first sample includes transactions in which the 
acquirer is from a developed-market and the target from an emerging-market 
(sample: DM-EM). The second sample includes observations where both the acquirer 
and the target are from developed-markets (sample: DM-DM). In addition, the second 
sample contains only acquirers which also appear in the DM-EM sample. This is 
necessary in order to examine whether the observed results can be linked to the 
emerging-market context.  
The four acquirer nations are chosen based on their M&A activity in the past. These 
countries have been most active in European cross-border acquisitions into 
emerging-markets in Europe between 1990 and 2011. The target nations Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia are the only emerging-markets in Europe 
(Morgan Stanley, 2012). The rationale behind the criteria elaborated above results 
from the research questions as well as the necessity to have data available for the 
proposed research methodology. Appropriately filtered data provides the basis for the 
event study as well as the multivariate regression analysis. 
3.2 Event Study Methodology 
In an efficient capital market, available information is reflected immediately in current 
stock prices, incorporating any expected value changes of the company (Neale & 
Pike, 2009). Thereby, event study methodology has become a standard in the 
evaluation of stock price reaction to firm specific and economic wide events. It allows 
researchers to conclude relatively easy whether the event had a positive or negative 
impact on shareholder wealth (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). Andrade et al. (2001) add that 
traditional short-term event studies provide the most statistically reliable evidence on 
value creation or destruction in M&A. Ex-post performance measures are more 
sensitive to different sample periods and the choice of the market portfolio that is 
used to measure risk (Barber, Richard, & Chih-Ling, 1999). 
This event study examines the impact of acquisition announcements on the wealth of 
the acquiring firms’ shareholders, i.e. the market reaction, by using this classical 
event study methodology. Because a single day may not show the full impact of an 
announcement on the company value, the returns are often examined for periods 
around an event day. At this point, two event windows are defined. The first window 
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is used for estimation purposes and is 130-days long, from t=-31 to t=-1601. Draper 
and Paudyal (1999) argue that, on average, M&As are anticipated by financial 
markets 30 days before the public announcement of the transaction. The anticipation 
will be reflected and incorporated to some degree in the stock price from t=-30 to t=-
1. Therefore, this period is not part of the regression. The second window is three 
days long, from t=-1 to t=1, where t=0 is the event day. It examines the direct impact 
of the announcement on the stock price.  
1. Time (-T1; -T2); the pre-event estimation window 
2. Time [-T2; +T3]; the event window 
Andrade et al. (2001) argue that statistical precision is reduced as the event window 
is lengthened; implying narrowly chosen event windows provide the most reliable 
evidence. Thus, the focus is placed on the three day event window, which is narrow 
and repeatedly chosen in empirical literature examining short-term wealth effects. 
Nevertheless, two further event windows, (-2, +2) and (-10, +10), are reported to 
illustrate the impact of different event windows on empirical findings. 
In order to determine the impact of the M&A announcement on the stock price, it is 
necessary to predict the stock price for the days under consideration, if the 
transaction had not been announced. Thereafter, the actual returns of the stocks on 
each day in the second event window are compared with the expected returns that 
are calculated with the help of the market model. The difference is the abnormal 
return that can be ascribed to have resulted from the particular event, in this case the 
M&A announcement (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). The stock price data for the particular 
firms in the event study does not show evidence for thin-trading or larger periods of 
subsequent non-trading days. The most frequently used method is to apply the last 
observed transaction price to the subsequent non-trading days; this results in zero 
returns (Bartholdy, Olson, & Peare, 2005). Maynes and Rumsey (1993) point out that 
the numerous zeros in the return data result in an underestimation of the variance of 
returns and biased inferences. Therefore, any transaction is dropped from the sample 
that shows more than 20% of zero returns in the estimation window. 
3.3 Market Model Using Regression Analysis 
Traditionally, the market model is assumed to be the underlying return-generating 
model that is used in the context of event studies. Elgers and Murray (1982) highlight 
superiority of market portfolios with a high number of assets whereby a market 
portfolio can be regarded as a good proxy for any asset included in the respective 
market portfolio. Each acquiring firm from one of the four developed-market countries 
under review in this paper is matched to the corresponding national index viz. France 
(CAC40), Germany (DAX30), Netherlands (AEX) and United Kingdom (FTSE100). 
The market model assumes a linear relationship between the return of a security and 
the return of the corresponding market portfolio. For each security i, it is assumed 
that the returns generated are given by:  𝐫𝐢𝐭 =  ∝𝐢+ 𝛃𝐢𝐫𝐦𝐭 + 𝐞𝐢𝐭                 (3.1)      
                                            
1 Pre-event estimation windows vary strongly. Bhagat et al. (2011) use t=-31 to t=-120; Aybar and Ficici 
(2009) use t=-11 to t=-265; Ings and Inoue (2012) use t=-21 to t=-220 
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Where rit is the expected return to security i and rmt the observed market return at 
time t. The security specific parameters αi and βi in Equation 3.1 are estimated from 
the market model regression, using stock price data from the pre-event estimation 
window. While the return on the market portfolio rmt incorporates market specific 
impacts on all the securities, βi is a measure of the systematic risk of the firm i with 
respect to the market (Aybar & Ficici, 2009). Under the assumption of linearity and 
normality of returns, eit is a random error term for security i at time t. The standard 
error of the residuals is calculated as: 
𝛔𝐢 = 𝟏𝐓!𝟐 𝐞𝟐𝐢𝐭𝐓𝐭!𝟏             (3.2)                                                       
 
where T is the length of the estimation period (T1 - T2 + 1). The model expressed in 
Equation 3.1 makes it possible to determine the return on the stock that would have 
been expected during the event window if the transaction had not been announced. It 
follows the calculation of the abnormal return: 𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭 =    𝐫𝐢𝐭 −  ∝𝐢−   𝛃𝐢𝐫𝐦𝐭         (3.3)           
                                        
where, ARit is the abnormal return to stock i at time t that equals the observed return 
rit to stock i at time t minus the predicted normal return. The abnormal returns are 
calculated for each day in the event window and for each firm in the sample. In order 
to make general conclusions about the behaviour of stock returns for a sample of N 
companies, it is necessary to compute the average abnormal return (AAR) for each 
day t in the event window: 𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐭 = 𝟏𝐍 𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭𝐍𝐢!𝟏          (3.4) 
      
From a statistical perspective it becomes necessary to test whether these abnormal 
returns are significant or not. T-test’s are a precise way of testing a statistical method. 
(Diamond & Jefferies, 2001). The stock time-series t-statistic for determining 
statistical significance is: 
𝐭 − 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭(𝐀𝐀𝐑𝐭) = 𝟏𝐍 𝐀𝐑𝐢𝐭𝛔𝐢𝐍𝐢!𝟏       (3.5)                  
 
Stocks with the highest variance need to have a correspondingly higher abnormal 
return to make the same contribution to the overall test statistic which is read against 
normal distribution tables under the null hypothesis that the mean day zero return is 
not different from zero. We would expect the null to be rejected, if the impact of the 
acquisition announcement has a significant impact on the returns of the sample firms 
(Draper & Paudyal, 1999). In line with Aybar and Ficici (2009), cumulative abnormal 
returns are standardised in order to correct for serial correlation in daily abnormal 
returns for the same firm. As reported by Coutts et al. (1995), serial correlation might 
be a problem for longer event windows such as (-5, +5) and (-10, +10). It is less of a 
problem in three day event windows. 
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Since the interest in this paper is not the abnormal return of a single day but rather 
for a period, the second event window [-T2; +T3], the abnormal returns need to be 
cumulated:  𝐂𝐀𝐑𝛄 = 𝐀𝐑𝐭𝛄𝐭!!𝐓𝟐             (3.6) 
         
Where γ ∈ of [-T2; +T3]. It follows the test for statistical significance where D = γ+T2+1 
is the number of days of abnormal returns which are cumulated. 𝐭 − 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭(𝐂𝐀𝐑𝛄) = 𝟏𝐃 𝐭 − 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭(𝐀𝐑𝐭)𝛄𝐭!!𝐓𝟐         (3.7)     
 
Unlike previous empirical work, this paper focuses on transactions into four 
emerging-market countries in Eastern Europe. Previous empirical work tends to 
neglect important European emerging markets, particularly during 2000-2011. 
3.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
Changes in the stock price of the acquirer reveal information about the potential 
wealth gains from the M&A, and event study methodology makes it possible to 
evaluate this stock market response. Value creation through cross-border M&A 
depends on a range of firm-, industry-, and country-specific factors. To test 
determinants of cross-sectional variations, in other words the relationship between 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and deal characteristics, the following 
multivariate regression model is used: 𝐂𝐀𝐑𝐢 = 𝛂+  𝛃𝟏𝐗𝟏 + 𝛃𝟐𝐗𝟐 +⋯+ 𝛃𝐤 + 𝛄𝟏 𝐃𝟏 +⋯+ 𝛄𝐤(𝐃𝐤) + 𝛆    (3.8) 
       
Since qualitative attributes (Private/ Public Target) are also included, it is necessary 
to make use of dummy variables. The dependent variable cumulated abnormal return 
(CAR) is explained by the regression model with k regressors (Xi, i = 1,…,k) and Ɛ is 
an i.i.d. error term. Dummy variables (Di, i = 1,…,k) include qualitative information. 
Using ordinary least square estimation (OLS), it is possible to estimate Equation 3.8. 
Da Graca and Masson (2012) suggest the use of a slightly different method and the 
use of general least square (GLS) as one alternative to OLS. According to them, 
most of the published event studies fail to reject the null hypotheses of no event 
effect because the traditional estimators are not BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimator). This problem is eventually solved by using GLS. However, they also note 
that as the number of events in the sample increases, their method starts to show 
potential drawbacks. Alternatively, Mentz and Schiereck (2008) use weighted least 
squares (WLS) to correct for heteroscedasticity in their cross-sectional analysis. They 
use the inverse of the standard deviation of the residuals (estimation period) as the 
weight. However, their robustness checks reveal that results remain unchanged no 
matter whether they use WLS, OLS, or GARCH(1,1) which, in addition, considers 
possible misspecification of stock returns. The estimation strategy that is used most 
often in the empirical papers analysed and reported in our literature review is OLS. 
Even though many researchers are aware of the problems that might be present with 
regards to their sample, e.g. heteroscedasticity, most of them assume ideal 
experiments; econometric problems in their studies are assumed to cancel out 
(Solibakke, 2002). 
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The literature review has revealed a large number of potential determinants of returns 
to cross-border acquirers that have been subject to extensive testing in previous 
studies. Bhagat et al. (2011) distinguish between two types of factors: i) classical 
factors and ii) governance factors. The private/public status of the company, industry 
relatedness, payment method, firm size, and corporate tax difference are typically 
allocated to classical factors. Governance factors are, including but not limited to: 
director compensation policies, board structure, minority shareholder rights, and 
concentration of stock ownership. Due to limited access to required data, it is not 
possible to include an array of variables. Therefore, the study focuses on a few 
variables for which data is available. 
Previous studies of acquirer returns to U.S. companies have shown evidence that the 
public listing status of the target firms is one determinant of acquirer returns. 
Whereas the acquisition announcement of private targets resulted on average in a 
positive CAR for the acquiring company, it caused zero or even negative returns in 
the case of publicly listed companies (Fuller et al. 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann 
2005; Aybar and Ficici 2009). A binary variable is included for the Status of the target 
companies. In line with these findings it is expected that the acquisition of private 
targets results in positive CARs. Whether it will be possible to draw conclusions from 
this and whether results will be significant is questionable since only 7 out of 66 
transactions involve a public target.  
Table 3.1: Cross-Sectional Determinants  
 
 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) and Bhagat et al. (2005) further suggest that 
Industry relatedness of the companies and the relative size (RelSize) of the target to 
the acquirer are determining factors. Regarding the former, prior empirical evidence 
puts forward that acquirer returns are more likely to be positive, if the industries of 
acquirer and target are related. The common assumption that prevails is that the two 
firms must be related in some way in order to benefit from synergies that accrue from 
an acquisition (Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988). As a measure of synergies, the 
Variables
Continuous variables
CAR (-1,+1) Acquirer's cumulative abnormal return for the three days around the acquisition announcement.
The market model is used to calculate the abnormal return.
Mcap Acquirer's market capitalization at the day of the acquisition announcement in million US dollars.
Shares outstanding at the last fiscal year end before the acquisition announcement times the 
share price at the announcement day.
TransValue Value of the transaction in million US dollars
RelSize The relative size of the transaction. Transaction values divided by acquiring companies' market
capitalization.
Binary variables
Industry Based on the four-digit SIC codes for the acquirer and target, a dummy varibale is assigned: 
it takes a value of 1 if the companies are in related industries (within 2-digit SIC code) and 
0 if otherwise.
Status A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the target is privately owned, and 0 otherwise.
The sample of 66 transactions includes only 7 publicly owned targets.
EM Emerging-market target. A dummy variable taking the value 1 if the target is located either in
Czech-Republic, Hungary, Poland, or Russia, and 0 otherwise.
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regression includes the industry diversification variable Industry. Therefore, it is 
possible to comment on whether CARs are higher when the acquiring and the target 
firms are in the same two-digit (SIC-code) industry. Concerning the latter, RelSize, 
large differences in firm size tend to have a positive impact on acquirer returns. Ings 
and Inoue (2012) and Nagano and Yuan (2007) found empirical evidence for the 
explaining variable “RelSize” at the 1% significance level. Previous empirical studies 
have included the relative size of the acquirer to the target as possible indicators of a 
firms bargaining power. Nagano and Yuan (2007) found statistically significant 
evidence for this in cross-border transactions into China. However, while the sign of 
the parameter relative firm size is positive in Moeller et al. (2004), it is negative in the 
empirical study by Nagano and Yuan (2007). In the latter case, negative sign, it 
means that an acquirer’s CAR is statistically lower when the acquirer is a large firm 
compared with the target. Therefore, large firms obtain a relatively lower synergy 
effect than small firms. The parameter sign is indeterminate. Table 3.1 provides a 
brief description of the explaining variables used and tested in this empirical study.  
Market capitalisation (Mcap) of the acquiring company is included as a proxy for the 
firm size to analyse whether size as an absolute figure can be linked to 
positive/negative cumulative announcement returns. Moeller et al. (2004) pointed out 
that an acquirer’s firm size is important in determining shareholder’s return based on 
their review of transactions in the U.S. Small firms tend to create more value in M&A 
than large firms because the incentives of managers are better aligned with those of 
shareholders and managers tend to be less prone to hubris.   
Although the regression includes controls for a number of determinants, the obtained 
results may be driven by acquirer specific characteristics that have little to do with the 
circumstance that the target is located in an emerging-market. For example, one 
thing to note is the median size of the acquirer and the target in the sample DM-EM. 
The median size of developed-market acquirers is $1.47 billion and that of emerging-
market targets is $67 million and therefore more than 21 times lower. In order to 
mitigate the risk of drawing wrong inferences from the regression analysis, Chari et 
al. (2004) suggest to compare the obtained results, in this case from the sample DM-
EM, to regression results without the involvement of emerging-markets, in this case 
the sample DM-DM. 
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Reaction to Cross-border M&A Transaction Announcements 
Table 4.1 reports the CAR for the three days around the transaction announcement 
and the corresponding transaction values for each year in the observed period. The 
average CAR for developed-market acquirers ranges from a low of -1.65% in 2004 to 
marginally above 4% in 2010.  
However, the significance of these values is limited given the low number of 
transactions in these particular years. The potential to draw wrong inferences is high 
because the impact of outliers is strong. Bearing this in mind, it is possible to put 
some emphasis on the four years from 2005 through 2008 in which 37 of the total of 
66 transactions in the DM-EM sample were announced. The average CAR for these 
years spans from 1.30% to 2.67%. Moreover, the average transaction value appears 
to have increased substantially during that period. Whereas it holds true that average 
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as well as median transaction values have increased, the extent is far less when 
adjusting for some of the few transaction values that exceed USD 1 billion.  
The average CAR was negative in the three years of the observation period, 
including the most recent year 2011. Nevertheless, acquiring shareholders obtained 
a positive CAR in nine out of the 12 observed years. Further, no matter whether 
adjusted for outliers or not, there is no obvious trend in the average or median 
transaction size. The wide range of average CAR for the specific years already 
illustrates what has been observed by Ings and Inoue (2012). Depending on the 
years which are observed, one might receive positive or negative CAR for a period of 
a couple years.  
Table 4.1: CAR and Deal Values 
 
Table 4.2 reports to which extent the four developed-market acquirers have been 
involved in cross-border transactions into emerging-market countries in Eastern 
Europe and the average and median CAR they generated in the past 12 years. The 
majority of acquisitions (36) were announced by UK firms. Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands follow with 12, 10, and 8 announcements respectively. Most often, the 
target was located in Poland (23) and Russia (22). Whereas acquirers from the 
Netherlands realized merely an average CAR of 0.36%, acquirers from the UK 
exhibited a significantly higher CAR of 1.64%. 
Table 4.2: CAR for Acquiring Countries 
 
 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find almost identical results when examining the 
short term wealth effects of cross-border transactions within the boundaries of 
Europe between 1993 and 2000. They observed higher abnormal returns for 
acquiring companies headquartered in the UK (1.5%) than in Continental Europe 
CAR (-1, +1) Deal value in USD
Year N Mean Median N Mean Median
2011 7 -0.05% -0.13% 7 123.35 14.26
2010 4 4.06% 3.59% 4 60.48 47.53
2009 1 1.64% 1.64% 1 1113.67 1113.67
2008 14 1.58% 3.17% 14 214.54 15.39
2007 9 2.67% 2.64% 9 429.01 257.10
2006 8 1.55% 1.24% 8 600.06 71.98
2005 6 1.30% 0.60% 6 1003.36 466.86
2004 4 -1.65% 0.44% 4 62.45 63.39
2003 1 4.13% 4.13% 1 5.98 5.98
2002 3 0.98% 2.54% 3 291.81 359.85
2001 6 0.32% -1.32% 6 130.85 49.59
2000 3 -0.14% -1.00% 3 72.44 25.00
DM-EM sample, N = 66
CAR (-1, +1) is the three day announcement period cumulative abnormal return.
CAR (-1, +1)
N Mean Median S.D.
Germany 12 0.64% 1.30% 2.45% CZ (4) ; Russia (4)
France 10 0.38% -0.39% 2.05% Poland (7)
Netherlands 8 0.36% -0.27% 2.66% Russia (3)
UK 36 1.64% 1.77% 3.76% Russia (15)
Top target nation: number of transactions from 2000 to 2011 in brackets.
Top Target Nation
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(0.9%). In contrast to this study, however, they focused on developed-markets and a 
five day event window centered on the announcement date. Nevertheless, the fact 
that acquirers from the UK clearly benefit more from the M&A than acquirers from the 
other three developed-markets supports what has been observed several times 
before. Repeatedly, the authors conclude that discrepancies in announcement 
returns between acquiring countries are the product of certain combinations of 
acquirer and target countries (Eun et al., 1996) and (Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004). So far, the results of this study suggest that acquiring companies 
headquartered in the UK benefit more than acquirers in continental Europe. 
Table 4.3: Abnormal Returns to Acquirers in Emerging-Market Transactions 
 
 
Table 4.3 (Panels A and B) summarises the abnormal returns for developed-market 
acquirers during 2000-2011 without differentiating between different countries. While 
Panel A reports daily abnormal returns for the five days preceding and for the five 
days following the announcement day 0, Panel B highlights the CAR around the 
announcement. On the announcement day, developed-market acquirers experience 
an average return of 0.87%. This return is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level. Moreover, the market response is positive in 65.15% of the acquisition 
announcements. The two days immediately following day 0 also show a positive 
abnormal return. However, as indicated by the t-test, the returns lack statistical 
significance. Not so the average CAR during the three and five days around day 0, 
see Panel B. The return of 1.26% for the three day event window is significant at the 
Panel A: Daily abnormal returns (market model, N = 66)
Day Average Median % Positive t-test
+5 0.15% 0.10% 53.03% 1.051
+4 0.07% 0.20% 54.55% -0.616
+3 -0.42% -0.16% 40.91% -0.819
+2 0.44% 0.13% 54.55% 0.623
+1 0.45% 0.11% 53.03% 1.163
0 0.87% 0.26% 65.15% 2.683 ***
-1 -0.06% 0.11% 51.52% 0.922
-2 0.02% -0.03% 48.48% -0.362
-3 -0.34% -0.25% 39.39% -1.182
-4 -0.17% 0.04% 51.52% -0.673
-5 -0.08% -0.04% 45.45% -0.803
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (Market model, N = 66)
Period Average Median % Positive t-test
CAR (-1, +1) 1.26% 0.237% 56.57% 2.752866 ***
CAR (-2, +2) 1.72% 0.167% 54.55% 2.249115 **
CAR (-10, +10) 1.77% -0.004% 49.86% 0.406532
CAR is the acquirer's cumulative abnormal return during the indicated period
around the acquisition announcement for the total sample of 66 acquisitions.
  * 10% significance level
 ** 5% significance level
*** 1% significance level
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1% level and the return of 1.72% for the five day event window at the 5% level. The 
CAR for the broadest event window (-10, +10) is positive but it lacks statistical 
significance; statistical precision is reduced as the event window is lengthened. This 
is not surprising given the fact that a company’s stock price might be changing by the 
minute, adapting to any information that might have an impact on its future earning 
capabilities. Many things can happen in a timeframe of 21 days. 
The results reported in Panel B are consistent with some of the previous findings. 
Chari et al. (2010) analysed 594 cross-border transactions of developed market 
acquirers from ten different developed-market countries and target firms from 43 
different emerging-markets between 1986 and 2006. Over a three-day event window, 
he showed that cross-border transactions into emerging-markets lead to a statistically 
significant increase in the acquiring firm’s stock price of 1.16%. This study stretches 
across different years than the one carried out by Chari et al. (2010) and even though 
the sample DM-EM comprises merely four and not 43 different emerging-markets, 
the CAR differs only by 0.1% points for three days around the announcement day. 
When comparing the results to an empirical study with more recent transaction data, 
the findings are still very similar and differ merely by 0.12% points. Ings and Inoue 
(2012) focused on transactions data into emerging-markets between 2000 and 2010. 
We exhibit an overlap in the time period of ten years between the two studies, while 
the acquirers are from different developed-markets and the target countries are 
different as well. 
In summary, on average, developed-market acquirers experience a positive and 
significant CAR (-1, +1) of 1.26%, supporting Hypothesis 1 that the market reaction to 
acquisition announcements of emerging-market targets in Eastern Europe are 
beneficial to acquiring shareholders. In line with previous findings, acquirers from the 
UK exhibit a positive and higher CAR than acquirers from continental Europe. 
Further, for samples with transaction data >10 years, the wealth gains for acquiring 
shareholders from developed-markets under review in this paper are only marginally 
different to the two most recent empirical studies on cross-border transactions into 
emerging-markets; no matter whether the sample stretches across the time 1986-
2006 or 2000-2010. Studies focusing on older transaction data exhibit even higher 
CAR. See Table 2.3 for an overview.   
4.2 Cross-border Acquisitions into Developed-Markets 
So far, the results suggest that cross-border acquisitions into emerging-markets in 
Eastern Europe create significant positive abnormal returns to acquiring shareholders 
from developed-markets. However, at the moment it is not clear whether emerging-
markets contribute to the results in this study or whether returns are driven by 
acquirer characteristics. Do acquirer firm returns increase during an acquisition 
announcement regardless of the target location? To answer this question it is 
necessary to analyse acquisitions made by the same acquirers as in section 4.1., but 
with the difference that the target is located in a developed-market. In order to limit 
the potential sources that can cause discrepancies in announcement returns, 
domestic transactions are not considered in the sample DM-DM. 
Table 4.4 (Panels A and B) summarises the abnormal returns to developed-market 
acquirers in cross-border transactions into other developed-markets in Europe during 
2000-2011. While Panel A reports daily abnormal returns for the five days preceding 
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and for the five days following the announcement day 0, Panel B highlights the CAR 
around the announcement. 
Table 4.4: Abnormal Returns to Acquirers in Developed-Market Transactions 
 
 
On the announcement day, developed-market acquirers experience a statistically 
insignificant daily return of -0.24%. The market response on this day is positive in 
42.37% of the acquisition announcements, compared to 65.15% when an emerging-
market target is involved. The only statistically significant daily return is observed on 
the day following the acquisition announcement, 0.49%. Excluding day -1, it is 
noticeable that median daily returns are marginally above or below 0 for the five days 
surrounding the acquisition announcement day. However, as indicated by the t-test, 
the returns lack statistical significance. Not so the average CAR during the three and 
five days around day 0. The CAR of 0.37% and 0.50% for the three day and five day 
event window, respectively, is significant at the 10% level. The positive CAR is in line 
with empirical findings in Campa and Hernando (2004) and Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004).  
The major difference between the studies is the observed period. Campa and 
Hernando (2004) observed a CAR (-1, +1) of 0.05% from 1998 to 2000. Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004), on the other side, observed a statistically significant and positive 
return of 2.38% and 3.09% for the announcement windows (-1, 0) and (-2, +2), 
respectively, from 1993 to 2000. Reflecting on these big differences between 
Panel A: Daily abnormal returns (market model, N = 59)
Day Average Median % Positive t-test
+5 0.25% 0.09% 57.63% 1.194
+4 -0.21% -0.12% 47.46% -0.372
+3 0.35% 0.30% 57.63% 1.124
+2 0.12% 0.00% 49.15% 0.811
+1 0.49% 0.01% 50.85% 1.868 *
0 -0.24% -0.21% 42.37% 0.176
-1 0.12% 0.33% 54.24% 0.840
-2 0.02% -0.02% 49.15% 0.068
-3 -0.44% 0.01% 50.85% -1.504
-4 -0.24% -0.26% 45.76% -1.110
-5 -0.10% -0.08% 49.15% -0.431
Panel B: Cumulative abnormal returns (Market model, N = 59)
Period Average Median % Positive t-test
CAR (-1, +1) 0.37% -0.040% 49.15% 1.66524 *
CAR (-2, +2) 0.50% -0.008% 49.15% 1.68273 *
CAR (-10, +10) 0.19% -0.011% 49.23% 0.367177
CAR is the acquirer's cumulative abnormal return during the indicated period
around the acquisition announcement for the total sample of 59 acquisitions.
  * 10% significance level
 ** 5% significance level
*** 1% significance level
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empirical results one might conclude that the high positive announcement returns are 
the product of either i) the different timeframes for which the transaction data was 
gathered or ii) a certain combination of acquirer and target countries. However, the 
second thought loses its significance since both studies focus to a great extent on the 
same set of countries; the former mentioned study examines 15 developed-markets 
in Europe and the latter examines a total of 18, including the 15 countries from the 
first study. In contrast to the conclusion drawn in the previous section, in this case the 
difference in CAR might be driven by different time periods. In order to examine the 
sensitivity of the observed results (DM-EM and DM-DM) to changes in the timeframe, 
the observed period is split into three periods and separately examined. The periods 
are chosen in line with the changing economic environment for M&A as indicated in 
section 1.1, i.e. slowing economy up to the year 2003; booming economy, rising 
stock markets, low interest rates, and high liquidity in the markets from 2004 to the 
middle of 2008; and yet again an economic downturn from 2009 onwards.  
Table 4.5: CAR to Acquirers for Different Periods 
 
 
At first sight, Table 4.5 seems to support the inferences which Ings and Inoue (2012) 
have drawn from their findings: changes in time are one possible explanation for 
varying CAR. Though, the observations in this paper have to be interpreted with care 
and it has to be kept in mind that the results are partially lacking statistical 
significance.  
In general, the CAR seems to be linked to cross-border activity. The steep decline 
following the dot-com bubble burst goes hand in hand with negative announcement 
returns in developed- as well as emerging-market cross-border activity from 2000-
2003, see Figure 1.2. Thereby, the negative impact was lower in cross-border 
transactions involving an emerging-market target, as indicated by Table 4.5.  
Average Median N t-test
2009 - 2011
  CB - Developed -0.27% 0.09% 10 1.014308
  CB - Emerging 1.46% 0.81% 13 1.24642
2004 - 2008
  CB - Developed 0.72% 0.35% 38 1.856983 *
  CB - Emerging 1.94% 1.33% 41 2.492738 **
2000 - 2003
  CB - Developed -0.38% -1.03% 11 -0.56195
  CB - Emerging -0.62% -0.71% 12 -1.13042
CAR (-1, +1) is the three day announcement period cumulative abnormal returns.
CB - Developed: Acquirer from France, Germany, Netherlands, UK involving in 
cross-border transactions into developed-markets in Europe
CB - Emerging: Acquirer from France, Germany, Netherlands, UK involving in 
cross-border transactions into Czech-Rep., Hungary, Poland, Russia
***, **,and * denote Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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The majority of M&A in the sample were announced in the period of economic boom 
from 2004 to 2008. The median CAR to acquirers is 0.98% points higher in cross-
border transactions into the four emerging-markets than into developed-markets. On 
average, it is 1.94% and statistically significant at the 5% level. Even though CARs 
are not significant for 2000-2003 and 2009-2011, the findings highlight the 
differences that might result from changing the time periods. 
Concluding, the average CAR suggests that developed-market acquirers benefit 
regardless of whether the target is located in an emerging-market or not. Though, the 
gain of 1.26% is 0.89% points higher with emerging-market involvement. In this case, 
it might more correct to focus on median returns since the sample size is relatively 
small and contains a few high positive outliers. Concentrating on median returns, 
developed-market acquirers experience statistically significant positive wealth gains 
of 0.237% when the target is located in an emerging-market and a slightly negative 
CAR (-1, +1) of -0.04% in developed-market cross-border transactions.  
The study results support the two constructed hypotheses in section 2.3. Cross-
border transactions into Eastern European emerging-markets lead to a statistically 
significant and positive shareholder wealth effect to the acquiring firms from 
developed-markets during the three days around the announcement date. Moreover, 
results suggest that cumulative abnormal returns are higher with emerging-market 
involvement than in pure cross-border transaction between developed-markets. In 
the following section the author discusses whether it is possible to identify any 
specific determinants that might be responsible for the observed results. 
4.3 Cross-Sectional Determinants of Foreign Acquirer’s Returns  
In this section, we explore the determinants of CAR as a function of industry, country, 
and firm-specific characteristics. Table 4.6 reports the regression results for the 
cross-sectional determinants of CAR (-1, +1) for three different regression models. 
Model 1 displays the results for the full sample of 125 transactions into developed- 
and emerging-markets. Model 2 and Model 3 present the estimates for the DM-EM 
and DM-DM sample, respectively. Given the lack of significance with respect to most 
of the variables, I will concentrate on elaborating the findings for the significant 
variable RelSize. While there is a significant positive relation between the CAR to 
acquirers and the relative size of the transaction in all regression specifications, the 
other control variables are not significant in any of them. 
In the literature, the RelSize variable is frequently significant, though the sign of the 
coefficient differs from finding to finding. While Moeller et al. (2004) reported a 
significant positive relation, Nagano and Yuan (2007) found statistically significant 
evidence for a negative sign of this parameter. Asquith et al. (1983) suggest the 
following explanation for the inconsistent sign. If a single dollar spent on acquisitions 
results in the exact same positive return regardless of the size of the transaction, the 
abnormal return should increase with an increase of target size relative to acquirer 
size. But, if an M&A is paid for with equity, an increasing larger acquisition will result 
in a bigger upsurge in the number of shares outstanding after the transaction has 
been completed. In the case of a downward sloping demand curve for the shares of 
the acquiring firm, ceteris paribus, the abnormal return will decrease with the 
increasing relative size of the acquisition that results in a negative sign in the 
coefficient. Since the variable has a positive coefficient, it follows that the relative size 
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variable falls as bidder size increases, ceteris paribus, the bidder returns are 
negatively related to bidder size. The RelSize coefficient of 0.018 in Model 2 (DM-
EM) is significant at the 10% level. When controlling for the other variables, the 
estimate suggests the relative size of the target to the bidder drives acquirer returns 
up by 1.8% in the three day event window surrounding the acquisition 
announcement. Model 2 lacks overall significance as indicated by the F-statistic. The 
adjusted R2 states that 3.16% of the variation in returns can be explained with the 
included variables. The relatively low value is not uncommon and rather typical. 
Throughout all empirical studies which have been subject to this research, the 
adjusted R2 moves between 0.067 and 0.162. Model 1 and Model 3 denote statistical 
significance of the RelSize variable and the entire models at the 1% level.  
Table 4.6: Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
 
 
Moeller et al. (2004) report a significant negative size effect when using a continuous 
measure of size in their regression (logarithmic market capitalisation). It is meaningful 
to use the logarithm if the sample is biased towards small or large firms. In this study 
it is biased towards small firms, therefore, the logarithm of acquirer market 
capitalisation is used as a size measure to capture meaningful variation in firm size. 
According to their line of arguments, large firms are more likely to be overvalued and 
that is why an acquisition announcement might signal to the market that the true 
market value of the firm is too high at that moment. They found significant and robust 
evidence for the size effect; smaller firms outperform larger firms in terms of 
abnormal return associated with acquisition announcements. Even though size is 
included as one of the possible determinants for returns in the regression analysis in 
most empirical studies, the results are often insignificant (Chari , Quimet, & Tesar, 
2004b). Comparable, this study shows that there is no significant statistical 
relationship between cumulative abnormal returns to the acquirer and size of the 
target or acquirer.  
Chang (1998), Fuller et al. (2002), and Moeller et al. (2004) provide evidence that the 
abnormal return for acquirers is higher in the case of acquisition announcements of 
                                            
2 See (Mentz & Schiereck, 2008) for extremely low R2 and Chari et al. (2004b) for significant regression models and high R2. 
Variables β t β t β t
Constant 0.005433 0.337 0.008744 0.413 0.003042 -0.114
log(Mcap) 0.000206 0.136 -0.000408 -0.188 0.001741 0.703
TransValue -0.000004 -1.597 -0.000007 -0.989 -0.000005 -1.845
RelSize 0.028150 *** 4.254 0.018100 * 2.113 0.043270 *** 4.104
Industry -0.000662 -0.102 0.005700 0.643 -0.004372 -0.443
Status -0.008474 -0.936 0.001745 0.132 -0.014450 -1.12
EM 0.009404 1.464
N 125 66 56
Adjusted R2 0.1376 0.03165 0.2208
F 4.298 *** 1.425 4.117 ***
The dependent variable is the three day cumulative abnormal return around announcement 
date CAR (−1, +1). Other variables are defined in Table 6.
***, **,and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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private firms. Regression results are marginally negative in Model 1+3 and positive in 
Model 2 for the variable Status, but insignificant. Similarly, the Industry coefficient 
estimate is positive but statistically insignificant. The statistical insignificance 
suggests that the acquisition announcement of a target in an unrelated line of 
business does not affect the acquirer’s abnormal returns. Further, when a dummy 
variable for an emerging-market target is introduced into the regression in Model 1, 
there is no significant evidence that, specifically, emerging-market involvement is 
driving CAR. 
Concluding, as mentioned in section 3.4, many researchers are aware of the fact that 
econometric problems might be present in their sample and accept them (Da Graca 
& Masson, 2012). Some of them assume that potential problems cancel out 
(Solibakke, 2002). We have checked whether our assumptions are satisfied for the 
meaningful use of regression analysis and the sample data has been checked for 
robustness before carrying out our regressions. Event study methodology has 
become a standard in the evaluation of stock price reaction and provides the most 
statistically reliable evidence on value creation or destruction in M&A (Aybar & Ficici, 
2009) and (Andrade et al., 2001).  
This paper focuses on the immediate impact of M&A on the stock price around the 
announcement. Even though stock price changes are a good indicator of how the 
transaction is perceived by the market, one has to bear in mind that event studies 
assume that the efficient market hypothesis holds. Further, the methodological 
approach is limited in the sense that it does not allow to say much about the value 
generating potential of the combined entity in future periods. M&A might initially be 
perceived negatively, resulting in a loss in shareholder value at the beginning, but in 
the long-term, following a successful integration, it is also likely that acquiring 
shareholders benefit from the M&A. Following the transaction, working capital 
utilisation, solvency, liquidity, and general profit generating capabilities are all factors 
that can be utilised to determine whether value was generated for the acquiring 
shareholders or not. Undoubtedly, improvements of any of these factors might show 
a positive impact on the stock price. However, these factors have limitations on their 
own, e.g. accounting based, not frequently updated and available. Consequently, 
event study methodology and regression analysis remains best practice when 
examining short-term wealth effects and the literature does not provide an alternative 
that seems worthwhile using.  
5 Conclusions 
This paper analyses the cumulative abnormal returns to acquirers from developed-
markets in Europe in 125 cross-border M&As during 2000-2011. It provides an 
answer to the question whether cross-border transactions into Eastern European 
emerging-markets lead to a positive shareholder wealth effect to the acquiring firms 
from developed-markets during the three days around the announcement date. 
Moreover, it suggests whether these returns are higher than the returns to cross-
border acquisitions between developed-market countries. The reasoning behind this 
study is to support executive management which is planning on investing in 
emerging-markets in Eastern Europe in their decision making process by allowing 
them to make informed statements about the anticipated future impact of M&A on the 
stock price. In contrast to other empirical studies, this empirical study considers only 
cross-border transactions within the boundaries of Europe.  
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This empirical study has shown that cross-border transactions into Eastern European 
emerging-markets lead to a positive and significant shareholder wealth effect to the 
acquiring firms from developed-markets during the three days around the 
announcement date. Further, the CAR to acquirers is higher than in cross-border 
transactions between developed-markets. Regression results that control for firm and 
deal characteristics suggest that CARs are linked and significantly driven by the 
relative size of the target to the acquirer. This result is robust to the inclusion of a 
number of controls for industry, country, and firm-specific characteristics. There is no 
evidence that other variables have a significant impact on the CAR of the 125 
transactions under review in this paper. The evidence is consistent with observations 
made by Ings and Inoue (2012) with a sample period from 2000 to 2010. Regardless 
of the target location, developed-market acquirers experience a significantly positive 
average CAR. Median CAR on the other hand is positive only with emerging-market 
involvement and slightly negative for cross-border transactions between developed-
market acquirers. 
Results vary greatly among different empirical studies on the stock price reaction of 
M&A announcements. The variation in empirical results is not surprising since the 
process of cross border M&A itself can be very complex (DePamphilis, 2012). In 
addition to the driving forces of M&A activity outlined earlier (section 2.1.3), other 
factors might have a strong impact on the result in the empirical papers, i.e. firm, 
industry, country, or time-specific drivers. The particular aspect of time and its 
influence on shareholder returns has been investigated and found to be of high 
relevance, especially for periods of 3-4 years. There are a number of possible 
explanations for the discrepancies in the announcement returns for acquirers from 
developed-markets and emerging-market targets. Andrade et al. (2001) further 
highlights the aspect that it is very difficult for firms to make investments decisions 
that consistently create wealth for shareholders, which is not surprising in an 
economy with competition and a fairly efficient capital market. In conclusion, in the 
short-term, the announcement of cross-border transactions into emerging-countries 
in Europe is beneficial for acquiring shareholders.  
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